The NCAA Committee on Infractions (“Committee” or “Panel” or “COI”) recently issued its findings and found that the University of California, Santa Barbara (“Institution” or “UCSB”) committed violations of NCAA legislation. This case centered on practice violations in the men’s and women’s cross country and track and field programs (“track program”) at UCSB and inducement and benefit violations in the institution’s men’s water polo program. Additionally, both the track and water polo head coaches failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance in their programs and therefore violated head coach responsibility legislation.

The Committee concluded that UCSB committed the following violations:

Violations of NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 17.1.7.2.1 (2014-15 through 2017-18); 17.1.7.4 (2015-16 through 2016-17); 17.5.6 and 17.5.6.1 (2014-15); 17.6.6 and 17.6.6.1 (2015-16 through 2017-18); and 17.1.7.6 (2017-18)

For two and a half years, the head track coach monitored student-athletes’ training activity during times when countable athletically related activities are prohibited: summer months outside the playing season and weekly days off during the playing season. The head track coach’s monitoring converted the training activity into impermissible CARA. UCSB agreed that CARA violations occurred and that they were Level II. The head track coach substantially agreed to the facts but argued that those facts did not constitute a violation. He also argued that if any violation did occur, it was Level III. The Panel concluded that Level II CARA violations occurred.

From the summer of 2015 through December 2017, the head track coach expected his distance runners to train during the summer and on their in-season weekly day off; he expected them to log these training activities on a spreadsheet he reviewed; he provided feedback on their training; and he admonished or otherwise punished student-athletes who did not meet his training or logging expectations. The head coach’s monitoring meant that the student-athletes’ training activities during these times were not truly voluntary. Rather, these activities became impermissible CARA that violated multiple provisions of Bylaw 17.

Bylaw 17 governs playing and practice seasons. Among other things, the bylaw establishes when student-athletes may engage in CARA during and outside the playing season. Bylaw 17.02.1 defines CARA as any required activity with an athletics purpose involving student-athletes and at the direction of, or supervised by, one or more members of the coaching staff. Bylaws 17.1.7.2, 17.6.6 and 17.6.6.1 generally prohibit student-athletes from engaging in any CARA outside of the playing season, including during institutional vacation periods and summer.10 During the playing season, Bylaws 17.1.7.4 and 17.1.7.6 require one day off per week, during which CARA is prohibited.11 During times when CARA is not allowed, student-athletes may engage in voluntary athletically related activity that they initiate on their own. Pursuant to Bylaw 17.02.19, an activity is voluntary if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the student-athlete is not required to report back to a coach or other athletics department staff member; (2) the activity is initiated and requested solely by the student-athlete; (3) the student-athlete’s attendance and participation in the activity is not recorded for purposes of reporting it to coaching staff members or other student- athletes; and (4) the student-athlete is not subjected to penalty if they choose not to participate in the activity.

Due to the head track coach’s involvement and monitoring, summer training and Sunday long runs were not truly voluntary for UCSB distance runners. Student-athletes knew that the head track coach reviewed their training logs and would provide feedback. They also knew there could be repercussions if they did not log their activities or follow the training schedule. Those repercussions included calls or emails from the head coach during the summer and verbal admonishments or dismissal from practice during the season. Under these circumstances, it did not matter that the head coach labeled training “voluntary” or “optional” or that coaches were not present. The head coach’s actions created a perception among the student-athletes that the training was required. Furthermore, it did not meet any of the criteria that make an activity voluntary: (1) student-athletes were required to report their activity to the head coach; (2) the activity was not initiated solely by the student-athlete; (3) the student-athletes’ participation was recorded through the shared online spreadsheet; and (4) there were penalties for those who did not participate. Consequently, the summer training activities constituted impermissible CARA in violation of Bylaws 17.1.7.2.1, 17.6.6 and 17.6.6.1, and the Sunday long runs deprived student-athletes of the weekly in-season day off required by Bylaws 17.1.7.4 and 17.1.7.6.

Contrary to the head track coach’s arguments, the physical demands of distance running do not merit an exception to these rules. CARA restrictions ensure that student-athletes in all sport programs have time to rest, recover and focus on their academic work. Although student-athletes may choose to train during times when CARA is prohibited, there can be no suggestion by the coaching staff that they are expected to do so.

The COI has previously concluded that otherwise voluntary activity became impermissible CARA when coaching staff monitored the activity or required student-athletes to record or report the activity. See San Jose State University (2018) (concluding in an SDR that when the head baseball coach and his staff required student-athletes to participate in certain pre- and post-practice activities and/or observed the activities, they converted the activities from voluntary to countable) and California State University, Sacramento (2018) (Sacramento State) (concluding in an SDR that CARA violations occurred when the head men’s and women’s tennis coaches monitored student-athletes’ out-of-season training activity, including creating a point system as a means to monitor summer workouts and asking student-athletes to participate in tennis matches over winter break and report the results).13 As in these cases, the head track coach’s monitoring of distance runners’ summer training and Sunday runs turned the training into countable activity in violation of Bylaw 17.

Pursuant to Bylaw 19.1.2, the panel concludes that the CARA violations are Level II. Because the track student-athletes were engaging in countable activity at times when it was prohibited, UCSB gained more than a minimal competitive advantage over other institutions that were adhering to CARA limitations. Furthermore, this activity spanned a two-and-a-half-year period and was therefore not isolated or limited in scope. In previous cases where CARA violations have occurred over an extended period, the COI has concluded the violations are Level II. See San Jose State (concluding that CARA violations occurring over a six-and-a-half-month period were Level II); Sacramento State (concluding that CARA violations occurring over a span of three and a half years were Level II). In contrast, the COI has concluded that CARA violations were Level III when they were limited in scope, thus minimizing the competitive advantage gained. See San Jose State University (2016) (concluding that a non-qualifier’s participation in team CARA was a Level III violation because the conduct occurred on only nine occasions where the non-qualifier “jumped in and out” of the session). The CARA violations in this case are consistent with the scope of violations designated as Level II in previous cases.

Violations of NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 13.2.1 and 13.2.1.1-(h) (2014-15)

During the summer of 2015, the head water polo coach facilitated the arrangement for student- athlete 1 to live with the club coach prior to enrollment, which resulted in impermissible recruiting inducements in the form of free lodging, meals and transportation. UCSB agreed that the violation occurred and was Level II. The head coach disputed the allegation and argued that if any violation did occur, it was Level III. The Panel concluded that a Level II violation occurred.

The head water polo coach initiated a relationship between student-athlete 1 and the club coach that triggered a series of impermissible recruiting inducements for the student-athlete: one month of free housing, meals and transportation provided by the club coach and his family. These recruiting inducements, which had a value of approximately $735, violated Bylaw 13.

Bylaw 13 governs recruiting, with Bylaw 13.2.1 generally prohibiting institutional staff members from being involved, either directly or indirectly, in making arrangements for or offering any benefits to a prospect that are not otherwise available to non-student-athletes. Bylaw 13.2.1.1-(h) identifies “free or reduced-cost housing” as a specifically prohibited benefit.

Although the parties may disagree on the particulars of what was said, the record establishes that a conversation took place between the head water polo coach and the club coach that set in motion a month’s worth of recruiting inducements for student-athlete 1. At a minimum, the head coach informed the club coach of the following: (1) student-athlete 1 was interested in coming to Santa Barbara early; (2) student-athlete 1 wanted to compete on a club team during the summer before he enrolled; and (3) student-athlete 1 would need somewhere to live during that summer. The head coach also provided contact information to connect the club coach and the student-athlete. Although he did not make an actual or specific request for the club coach to house the student- athlete, this conversation precipitated the housing arrangement. The club coach went on to house the student-athlete rent free for approximately one month, during which time the club coach and his family provided the student-athlete with frequent free meals and transportation. In this way, the head water polo coach was involved in arranging free or reduced-cost housing and other impermissible recruiting inducements, which violated Bylaws 13.2.1 and 13.2.1.1-(h).

In reaching its conclusion that a Bylaw 13 violation occurred, the panel had to undertake credibility assessments regarding the various statements of the club coach and the head coach. The panel gave less weight to the club coach’s July 2019 declaration than his October 2017 interview statements, in which he clearly recalled the head coach telling him about student-athlete 1 and stating that he would need a place to live. The interview occurred closer in time to the arrangement of housing, when the club coach’s recollections were likely to be fresher. Therefore, it is more reliable. It is also more reliable than the statements of the head coach, who could not state with certainty that he did not have a conversation with the club coach regarding student-athlete 1.

The panel also considered the interpretive information provided by the AMA staff at the hearing but determined that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the scenario discussed by AMA. Specifically, the facts differ in three respects: (1) this case involves pre-enrollment housing for a prospective student-athlete rather than fall housing for an enrolled freshman; (2) the fact pattern described by AMA involved pairing up student-athletes for purposes of facilitating housing, whereas this case involves arranging housing with an individual unaffiliated with the institution; and (3) the head water polo coach’s actions went beyond merely providing contact information— he set the housing arrangement in motion. Furthermore, the panel’s conclusion in this case is consistent with past cases in which the COI determined that an institutional staff member’s facilitation of housing for a prospect during the summer prior to initial enrollment violated Bylaw 13. See Boise State University (2011) (concluding Bylaw 13 violations occurred where football coaching staff members facilitated housing arrangements between prospective and enrolled student-athletes during the summer prior to the prospects’ initial enrollment) and Southeastern Louisiana University (2015) (concluding a Level II violation of Bylaw 13 occurred where the assistant women’s volleyball coach arranged for two incoming freshman student-athletes to live with enrolled student-athletes for approximately one week prior to the incoming student-athletes’ enrollment at the institution). The information provided by the AMA staff would not have changed the analysis in these cases and is likewise inapplicable here.

The COI has long warned of the heightened risk of violations when prospects move to the institution’s locale prior to enrollment. See University of Kansas (2006) (observing that “these situations can result in impermissible inducements/benefits being supplied by someone associated with the institution” and reiterating that “it is imperative that institutions carefully track the activities of prospects in the vicinity of campus during the summer prior to initial enrollment”). When institutions have not heeded this warning and prospects received housing and other benefits prior to enrollment, the COI has concluded that Bylaw 13 violations occurred. See Monmouth University (2017) (concluding Level II recruiting inducement violations occurred when the head men’s tennis coach arranged free housing for a prospect who arrived in the institution’s locale several months prior to enrollment) and University of South Florida (concluding in an SDR that Level II recruiting inducements occurred when the assistant men’s basketball coach provided approximately $400 to $500 in free lodging, meals and transportation to two prospects who arrived in the institution’s locale prior to enrollment). When prospects wish to arrive early, it is incumbent upon institutions and head coaches to know the details of these arrangements—e.g., when they are arriving, where they are staying, who they are interacting with—in order to minimize the risk of violations. When the early arrival is one of the head coach’s star recruits, as is the case here, the incentive to stay on top of these details should be even greater.

Pursuant to Bylaw 19.1.2, the Panel concluded that the recruiting inducements are Level II because they provided the institution with more than a minimal but less than a substantial recruiting advantage and conferred more than a minimal but less than a substantial benefit on student-athlete 1. The Level II designation is also consistent with the cases cited above.

Violations of NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 12.4.1-(a), 12.4.1-(b), 12.11.1, 16.8.1 and 16.11.2.1 (2015-16 through 2017-18)

Over a period of two years, the head and assistant water polo coaches provided impermissible extra benefits in the form of improper employment compensation and pay for work not performed to two student-athletes who worked as coaches for their water polo club. The enforcement staff alleged that the violation was Level I. UCSB agreed that the violation occurred and was Level I.  Both water polo coaches disputed the violation and level. The panel concludes the violation occurred, and it is Level II.

From the fall of 2015 to the fall of 2017, the two water polo coaches compensated student-athletes 1 and 2 with a monthly stipend at a rate well beyond the going rate for other student-athletes working at the water polo club. The stipend amount was tied directly to the amount of the student- athletes’ rent, belying any notion that the rate of compensation was based solely on the student- athletes’ experience, coaching skill or the number of hours worked. This improper compensation, along with compensation for work not performed, constituted an extra benefit under Bylaw 16 and violated Bylaw 12 rules involving student-athlete employment compensation.

Bylaw 12 governs amateurism and eligibility. Among other areas, it regulates how the employment of student-athletes can affect their eligibility. Under Bylaw 12.4.1, a student-athlete can receive employment compensation and remain eligible as long as two conditions are met: (1) the compensation is for work the student-athlete actually performed (Bylaw 12.4.1-(a)); and (2) the compensation is paid at a rate commensurate with the going rate in that locality for similar services (Bylaw 12.4.1-(b)). When a student-athlete is ineligible, Bylaw 12.11.1 obligates the institution to withhold the student-athlete from competition. Bylaw 16 governs awards and benefits. The general rule is established by Bylaw 16.11.2.1, which states that a student-athlete shall not receive any extra benefit. The bylaw defines “extra benefit” as any special arrangement by an institutional employee or booster to provide the student-athlete or his or her family members or friends with a benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation. Finally, Bylaw 16.8.1 permits institutions to provide expenses to eligible student-athletes who represent the institution in practice and competition.

The stipend amount paid by the club to student-athletes 1 and 2 was not commensurate with the going rate in the locality for similar services. To begin, they were the only UCSB student-athletes who were paid by stipend—all other student-athletes were paid an hourly rate. In paying student- athletes 1 and 2 a stipend, the water polo coaches did not follow their own criteria. Under that criteria, stipends were reserved for coaches with prior experience, a longer tenure at the club, or who worked a greater number of hours. At the time the club hired student-athletes 1 and 2, they were untested as coaches—the head and assistant water polo coaches knew them only as student- athletes. Yet, they hired them right out of the gate with a compensation arrangement that was previously reserved only for experienced coaches. This suggests that, at least initially, their compensation was based on their status as elite student-athletes rather than their coaching skills.

Also suggestive is the fact that the stipend amounts were tied directly to the student-athletes’ rent. The assistant water polo coach stated that the two student-athletes worked as much as they needed to cover their rent, and he transferred their pay directly to their landlord. As they moved into cheaper apartments and their rent decreased, so did their monthly stipends. If the student-athletes’ compensation was truly based on their coaching skills or hours actually worked, it is logical to expect that their compensation would increase as their experience increased. Here, the inverse was true.

Nevertheless, the head and assistant water polo coaches argued that the compensation was permissible because it was commensurate with the rates paid to head coaches at other water polo clubs throughout the state of California. According to the head coach’s research, those clubs paid between $20 to $50 per hour for head coaches with experience and training similar to student- athletes 1 and 2. By comparison, student-athletes 1 and 2 earned $29 and $36 per hour, respectively, when their stipends are converted to an hourly rate. These rates appear to fall within the range of rates paid by other clubs throughout the state. But they are still significantly higher than the $12 per hour rate the head coach’s club pays to other UCSB student-athletes.

The COI has previously held that student-athlete compensation is excessive or improper where it is not commensurate with the going rate for individuals in the same job with the same employer. See Marshall University (2001) (concluding a Bylaw 12.4.1-(b) violation occurred when a booster employed academic non-qualifiers during their initial year of enrollment and compensated them at a rate approximately four times higher than the prevailing wage for non-student-athlete workers in the same job) and Kansas State University (1997) (concluding the head women’s basketball coach violated Bylaw 12.4.1-(b) when he paid a student-athlete $230 for working two days at a team camp but paid other enrolled student-athletes only $80 for performing the same duties). As in these cases, the head and assistant water polo coaches cannot establish that they paid student- athletes 1 and 2 commensurate with the going rate when they were paid significantly more than other workers performing the same job for the same employer.14 Thus, the panel concludes this conduct violated Bylaw 12.4.1-(b).

Additionally, a violation of Bylaw 12.4.1-(a) occurred when the two coaches paid the student- athletes for work not actually performed. The club paid student-athlete 2 in July and August 2016 even though he was still in his home country and had not yet arrived in Santa Barbara and started coaching. In another instance, the club paid student-athlete 1 his full stipend in December 2015 despite the fact he had worked no more than seven hours that month. Although the two student- athletes claimed they worked extra hours to make up for these times, the case record does not sufficiently support this. Thus, the head and assistant water polo coaches’ conduct violated Bylaw 12.4.1-(a). Additionally, by providing the two student-athletes with improper compensation and pay for work not performed, they conferred a benefit that was not generally available to non- student-athletes. This violated Bylaw 16.11.2.1. And because the receipt of excess pay and extra benefits rendered the student-athletes ineligible, the institution violated Bylaws 12.11.1 and 16.8.1 when it failed to withhold them from competition and provided them with expenses.

Although the enforcement staff presented these violations as Level I—and the institution agreed— the panel concludes they are Level II. The enforcement staff’s argument rested on the amount of the improper compensation benefit (over $17,000) and the advantage conferred to the two-student athletes by covering their housing costs. But the exact amount of the compensation is clouded by the club’s poor recordkeeping. Moreover, the value of the benefit is not the sole determiner of level. Indeed, even in a recent case involving impermissible benefits totaling over $70,000, the COI relied on several other factors in addition to the value when concluding the violations were Level I. See Sacramento State (concluding the violations were Level I because they involved a significant monetary value and provided several advantages to the institution, including keeping student-athletes at the institution following a scholarship loss, easing the transition for incoming student-athletes by securing housing arrangements for them, providing access to training opportunities for prospects to improve their performance before arriving on campus, facilitating a talented prospect relocating to the area of campus by arranging access to housing and training, and creating opportunities to evaluate local prospects through their participation in the local tennis academy). Here, the benefits were more limited. While the improper compensation covered the student-athletes’ housing costs, the institution stated that it could have done the same through permissible financial aid. And nothing in the record demonstrates or suggests that the student- athletes’ commitment to UCSB was in any way tied to promises of compensation by the head coach’s club.

Furthermore, the COI has concluded in past cases that Level II violations occurred when the value of the benefit was comparable to the amount of improper pay received by student-athletes 1 and 2, and where the benefit provided more than a minimal but less than a substantial advantage to the student-athlete. See Brigham Young University (2018) (concluding in an SDR that Level II violations occurred when, over a two-year period, boosters provided a men’s basketball student- athlete with over $12,000 in extra benefits, including all-expense paid trips and the use of cars and automobile insurance) and University of the Pacific (2017) (concluding that a Level II extra benefit violation occurred when the head baseball coach arranged for the sister of a baseball student-athlete to receive $16,000 payment as a student trainer to offset housing costs for her and her brother). Consistent with these cases, and pursuant to Bylaw 19.1.2, the panel concludes that the improper compensation and extra benefits violations are Level II because they provided more than a minimal but less than a substantial or extensive impermissible benefit or advantage.

Violations of NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 11.1.1.1(2014- 15 through 2017-18)

 Both the head track coach and the head water polo coach failed to rebut the presumption of responsibility for the violations in their programs from 2015 through 2017. Specifically, both head coaches failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance in their programs due to their personal involvement in the violations and failure to consult with the compliance staff to ascertain whether their conduct was permissible. Additionally, the head water polo coach involved a direct report in the violations. UCSB agreed that the information in the record could reasonably support both head coach responsibility violations as alleged. The two head coaches disputed the allegations. The Panel concluded both head coach responsibility violations occurred, and they are Level II.

From the summer of 2015 through December 2017, the head track coach failed to meet his responsibility to promote an atmosphere of compliance within his program. He was directly involved in CARA violations that might have been avoided had he consulted with compliance regarding the permissibility of his monitoring activities. Instead, the head coach acted independently, disregarding well-known CARA rules to substitute his own judgment as to what was permissible for his student-athletes. The head track coach’s failure to promote an atmosphere of compliance violated Bylaw 11 head coach responsibility legislation.

Bylaw 11.1.1.1 establishes two affirmative duties for head coaches: (1) to promote an atmosphere of rules compliance and (2) to monitor the individuals in their program who report to them. The bylaw presumes that head coaches are responsible for violations in their programs. Head coaches may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that they promoted an atmosphere of compliance and monitored their staff.

Here, the head track coach could not rebut the presumption due to his personal involvement in the violations and his failure to communicate with the compliance staff. With respect to the former, the head coach was actively involved in monitoring student-athletes’ summer and day-off training activities, which turned those activities into CARA. Had the head coach consulted with compliance, he might have learned that his monitoring activities were impermissible. Instead, the head coach operated his training program according to his own assumptions of what CARA rules permitted and his assessment of what was best for his student-athletes. Proceeding under the belief that distance running has physical demands unique from other sports, the head track coach applied CARA rules in a way that completely undermined their purpose of ensuring student-athletes have time to rest, recover and focus on their academic work. Although the head track coach claimed that a previous UCSB compliance staff approved his training program at the outset of his career, the institution could not confirm whether this occurred. But even if it did, the obligation to consult compliance and maintain open lines of communication is ongoing. Rules change over time, and coaches have a continuing responsibility to ensure their practices and operations comply with modern and current legislation. By failing to meet this responsibility, and through his direct involvement in the CARA violations, the head coach violated Bylaw 11.1.1.1.

In attempting to rebut the presumption of responsibility, the head track coach focused on his history of compliance. He provided a series of emails in which he discussed compliance issues with student-athletes and raised questions with the compliance staff. He also pointed to other compliance efforts, including addressing key compliance concerns at weekly staff meetings, providing yearly instruction to staff on department rules and staying up to date on department policies. The panel recognizes these efforts, but they are not sufficient to overcome the presumption of responsibility under Bylaw 11. The head track coach’s failures were not simply a one-time lapse in judgment or the result of a misunderstanding as in previous cases where head coaches have rebutted the presumption of responsibility. See Pacific (concluding the head baseball coach did not violate Bylaw 11 where the underlying benefits violation resulted from a legitimate misunderstanding between the head coach and an associate athletics director and the head coach had a longstanding history of compliance) and Wichita State University (2015) (concluding the head baseball coach did not violate Bylaw 11 where he failed one time to ask follow-up questions regarding his administrative assistant’s impermissible benefits violation and otherwise had a long history of compliance). Unlike in these cases, the head track coach failed for over two years to consult compliance regarding his training and monitoring practices. As the COI has made clear in its decisions, compliance starts at the top. By failing to follow CARA rules and consult with compliance, the head track coach did not promote an atmosphere of compliance within his program.

The COI has concluded that head coach responsibility violations occurred in previous cases where head coaches have been personally involved in violations and failed to consult compliance. See Sacramento State (concluding in an SDR that the head women’s tennis coach could not rebut the presumption of responsibility where he was personally involved in CARA violations and failed to consult compliance on several issues, including housing for international prospects and potential recruiting and tryout violations) and Monmouth University (concluding the head men’s tennis coach could not rebut the presumption of responsibility where he was personally involved in arranging housing for a prospect and did not consult compliance regarding the prospect’s presence on campus prior to enrollment). The head track coach’s conduct here aligns with these cases. Additionally, consistent with these cases and Bylaw 19.1.2-(e), the head coach responsibility violation is Level II because it resulted from underlying Level II violations.

From the summer of 2015 to the fall of 2017, the head water polo coach failed to meet his responsibility to promote an atmosphere of compliance within his program. He was personally involved in arranging housing for student-athlete 1 and providing improper employment compensation to student-athletes 1 and 2. And as with the head track coach, these violations might have been avoided had the head water polo coach consulted compliance instead of relying on his own assumptions regarding what was permissible. The head water polo coach’s failure to promote an atmosphere of compliance violated Bylaw 11 head coach responsibility legislation, which is set forth above.

For over two years, the head water polo coach was involved in conduct that he should have known violated NCAA legislation. First, he was personally involved in facilitating housing for student- athlete 1—his star recruit—who moved from his home country to Santa Barbara prior to enrollment. The head coach did not consult compliance regarding the permissibility of this arrangement, and he did not take any affirmative steps to prevent violations from occurring once the student-athlete arrived in the vicinity of campus. For example, he did not seek out any information regarding when the student-athlete was arriving, who was picking him up, where he was staying, or who he would be associating with when he arrived. Instead, the head water polo coach remained detached from the situation and assumed the student-athlete would do what he needed to do once he arrived in the locale.

The head water polo coach was also personally involved in the improper compensation and extra benefit violations. Here again, he failed to communicate with compliance in order to ascertain whether the compensation arrangement with student-athletes 1 and 2 was permissible. Moreover, he involved the assistant coach—a direct report—in the violations. The head coach has admitted that the club did not keep good records and he did not communicate sufficiently with compliance regarding compensation for the student-athletes coaching at the club. This admission is underscored by the improvements the club has made to its record-keeping practices since the events in this case, as well as the mutual efforts by the compliance staff and the head and assistant water polo coaches to improve their lines of communication.

The Panel acknowledged the head water polo coach’s long history of compliance, but it is not enough to overcome the presumption of responsibility. Even a head coach with a strong track record can violate Bylaw 11 by failing to meet his responsibilities in a few key areas. As with the head track coach, the head water polo coach’s failures were not simply a one-time lapse in judgment or the result of a misunderstanding. See Pacific and Wichita State. Rather, over a two- year period, the head coach failed to consult compliance in instances where he either assumed he knew the rules or lacked the impetus to find out. The head coach’s conduct did not promote an atmosphere of compliance within the men’s water polo program.

As noted above, the COI has concluded that head coach responsibility violations occurred in previous cases where head coaches have been personally involved in violations and failed to consult compliance. See Sacramento State and Monmouth. Additionally, where head coaches have involved other staff members in the violations, the COI has concluded that they did not promote an atmosphere of compliance. See University of Oregon (2018) (concluding the head women’s basketball coach did not promote an atmosphere of compliance when he was actively involved in practice violations and encouraged the involvement of the assistant strength coach).

The NCAA enforcement staff alleged this violation as Level I, but the Panel concluded it is Level II. As with the head track coach’s Bylaw 11.1.1.1 violation, it arises from underlying Level II violations. Thus, consistent with Bylaw 19.1.2-(e) and the cases cited above, the head water polo coach’s violation is Level II. See Oregon, Sacramento State and Monmouth.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in accordance with NCAA Bylaws 19.9.3 and 19.9.4

Aggravating Factors for the Institution

19.9.3-(g): Multiple Level II violations by the institution;

19.9.3-(h): Persons of authority condoned, participated in or negligently disregarded the violation or related wrongful conduct; and

19.9.3-(i): One or more violations caused significant ineligibility or other substantial harm to a student-athlete or prospect.

Mitigating Factors for the Institution

19.9.4-(b): Prompt acknowledgment of the violations, acceptance of responsibility and imposition of meaningful corrective measures and/or penalties;

19.9.4-(c): Affirmative steps to expedite final resolution of the matter;

19.9.4-(d): An established history of self-reporting Level III or secondary violations; and

19.9.4-(h): The absence of prior conclusions of Level I, Level II or major violations committed by the institution.

Aggravating Factors for the Head Track Coach

19.9.3-(g): Multiple Level II violations by the assistant coach; and

19.9.3-(h): Persons of authority condoned, participated in or negligently disregarded the violation or related wrongful conduct.

Mitigating Factors for the Head Track Coach

The absence of prior conclusions of Level I, Level II or major violations. NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4-(h).

Aggravating Factors for the Head Water Polo Coach

19.9.3-(g): Multiple Level II violations by the individual.

19.9.3-(h): Persons of authority condoned, participated in or negligently disregarded the violations or related wrongful conduct; and

19.9.3-(i): One or more violations caused significant ineligibility or other substantial harm to a student-athlete or prospect.

Mitigating Factors for the Head Water Polo Coach

The absence of prior conclusions of Level I, Level II or major violations. NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4-(h).

Aggravating Factors for the Assistant Water Polo Coach

19.9.3-(i): One or more violations caused significant ineligibility or other substantial harm to a student-athlete or prospect.

Mitigating Factors for the Assistant Water Polo Coach

The absence of prior conclusions of Level I, Level II or major violations. NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4-(h).

As a result of the foregoing, the Committee penalized UCSB as follows:

1. Public reprimand and censure.
2. Probation: Two years of probation from November 5, 2019, through November 4, 2021.
3. Financial penalty: UCSB shall pay a fine of $5,000 plus one percent of each of the budgets for the men’s water polo, men’s cross country and women’s cross country programs.
4. Competition penalty: The men’s water polo team ended its 2018 season with its last regular- season contest and did not participate in postseason conference or NCAA tournament competition.
5. Scholarship reductions:
6. Men’s and women’s cross country and track and field: During the 2019-20 academic year, UCSB reduced by 5 percent the number of grant-in-aid equivalencies awarded in the men’s and women’s cross country and track and field programs. The reduction was based off the number of equivalencies awarded during the 2017-18 academic year. (Self-imposed.) During the 2020-21 academic year, UCSB shall reduce by 7.5 percent the number of grant- in-aid equivalencies awarded in the men’s and women’s cross country and track and field programs. The 7.5 percent reduction shall be based off the average number of equivalencies awarded in these programs during the previous four academic years.
7. Men’s water polo: During the 2019-20 academic year, UCSB reduced by 5% the number of grant-in-aid equivalencies awarded in the men’s water polo program. The reduction was based off the number of equivalencies awarded during the 2017-18 academic year. (Self- imposed.) During the 2020-21 academic year, UCSB shall reduce by 7.5 percent the number of grant-in-aid equivalencies awarded in the men’s water polo program. The 7.5 percent reduction shall be based off the average number of equivalencies awarded in the program during the previous four academic years.
8. Recruiting restrictions:

Men’s and women’s cross country and track and field official visits: For the 2018-19 academic year, UCSB reduced by 12.5 percent the number of official paid visits in the men’s and women’s cross country and track and field programs. The reduction was based off the average number of visits used in those programs during the 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 academic years. (Self-imposed.) For the 2020-21 academic year, UCSB shall reduce by 12.5 percent the number of official paid visits in the men’s and women’s cross country and track and field programs. The reduction shall be based off the average number of visits used during the previous four academic years.

Men’s and women’s cross country and track and field unofficial visits: For the 2020-21 academic year, UCSB shall prohibit unofficial visits in the men’s and women’s cross country and track and field programs for six weeks during the recruiting season.

9.Men’s water polo official visits: For the 2018-19 academic year, UCSB reduced by 12.5 percent the number of official paid visits in the men’s water polo program. The reduction was based off the average number of visits used during the 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 academic years. (Self-imposed.) For the 2020-21 academic year, UCSB shall reduce by 12.5 percent the number of official paid visits in the men’s water polo program. The reduction shall be based off the average number of visits used during the previous four academic years.

10. Men’s water polo unofficial visits: UCSB prohibited unofficial visits in the men’s water polo program for a six-month period from April 2018 through September 2018. (Self- imposed.) For the 2020-21 academic year, UCSB shall prohibit unofficial visits in the men’s water polo program for six weeks during the recruiting season.

11. Show-cause order (head track coach): The head track coach was personally involved in CARA violations for a two-and-a-half-year period and failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance in his program during this time. Therefore, the head track coach shall be subject to a one-year show-cause order from November 5, 2019, to November 4, 2020. Pursuant to COI IOP 5-15- 3-1, if the head track coach seeks employment or affiliation with any athletically related position at an NCAA member institution during the one-year show-cause period, any employing institution shall be required to contact the Office of the Committees on Infractions (“OCOI”) to make arrangements to show cause why restrictions on all athletically related activity should not apply.

Head coach restriction: The head track coach violated Bylaw 11 head coach responsibility legislation when he failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance in his program. Bylaw 19.9.5.5 and the Figure 19-1 penalty guidelines contemplate head coach suspensions to address head coach responsibility violations. Therefore, should the head track coach become employed in an athletically related position at an NCAA member institution during the one-year show- cause period, the head track coach shall be suspended from 30 percent of the season’s contests.  The suspension shall run concurrently with the show-cause order. Because the show-cause order restricts the head track coach from all athletically related activity, this suspension is subsumed within the show-cause order.

Although each case is unique, the show-cause order and head coach restriction are consistent with those prescribed in previous cases for Level II-Standard violations. See Monmouth (prescribing a one-year show-cause order and 30 percent suspension for the Level II-Standard violations of the head tennis coach who arranged for impermissible recruiting inducements in the form of housing, impermissible permitted a prospect to practice prior to enrollment and violated head coach responsibility legislation) and Rutgers (prescribing a one-year show-cause order and three-game self-imposed suspension for Level II-Standard violations of the head men’s football coach who failed to monitor the football ambassador program, failed to comply with institutional policy when he contacted the instructor to arrange an impermissible academic benefit for a student-athlete and violated head coach responsibility legislation).

12.  Show-cause order (assistant water polo coach): The assistant water polo coach provided impermissible benefits in the form of improper employment compensation and pay for work not performed to two student-athletes. Therefore, he shall be subject to a one-year show-cause order from November 5, 2019, to November 4, 2020. During the one-year show-cause period, the assistant water polo coach shall be suspended from all coaching duties for 30 percent of the season’s contests. The suspension shall be served subsequent to the completion of the head water polo coach’s suspension prescribed in Penalty No. 8. The provisions of this suspension require that the assistant coach not be present in the facility where contests are held and have no contact or communication with men’s water polo coaching staff members or student-athletes during the suspension dates. The prohibition includes all coaching activities for the period of time that begins at 12:01 a.m. on the day of the contest and ends at 11:59 p.m. that day. During that period, the assistant coach may not participate in any coaching activities, including, but not limited to, team travel, practice, video study, recruiting and team meetings. UCSB or any other NCAA member institution employing the assistant water polo coach during the one-year show-cause period shall adhere to this penalty. The plan for implementing the suspension shall be included in UCSB’s preliminary compliance report.  Although each case is unique, the show-cause order is consistent with those prescribed in other cases involving Level II-Standard violations, as described above. See Monmouth and Rutgers.

13.  Show-cause order (head water polo coach): The head water polo coach was personally involved in arranging a recruiting inducement and providing extra benefits in the form of improper compensation and pay for work not performed. Therefore, the head water polo coach shall be subject to a two-year show-cause order from November 5, 2019, to November 4, 2021. During the two-year show-cause period, the head coach shall be prohibited from participating in all off-campus recruiting activity. UCSB or any other NCAA member institution employing the head water polo coach during the two-year show-cause period shall adhere to this penalty.

Head coach restriction: The head water polo coach violated Bylaw 11 head coach responsibility legislation when he failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance in his program. Bylaw 19.9.5.5 and the Figure 19-1 penalty guidelines contemplate head coach suspensions to address head coach responsibility violations. Therefore, the head water polo coach shall be suspended from the first 30 percent of the season’s contests during the first year of the show-cause period. The provisions of this suspension require that the head water polo coach not be present in the facility where contests are held and have no contact or communication with men’s water polo coaching staff members or student-athletes during the suspension dates. The prohibition includes all coaching activities for the period of time that begins at 12:01 a.m. on the day of the contest and ends at 11:59 p.m. that day. During that period, the head coach may not participate in any coaching activities, including, but not limited to, team travel, practice, video study, recruiting and team meetings. The results of those contests from which the head coach is suspended shall not count toward the head coach’s career coaching record. The plan for implementing the suspension shall be included in UCSB’s preliminary compliance report.

Although each case is unique, the show-cause order and head coach restriction are consistent with those prescribed in previous cases involving Level II-Aggravated violations. See Sam Houston State University (2017) (prescribing a three-year show-cause order and 30 percent suspension for the Level II-Aggravated violations of the head tennis coach who provided impermissible recruiting inducements and benefits and engaged in impermissible contacts) and Prairie View A&M University (2017) (prescribing a two-year show-cause order for the Level II-Aggravated violations of the assistant men’s basketball coach, who provided extra benefits by arranging payment for a student-athlete’s course).

14.  Vacation of team and individual records: UCSB acknowledged that two men’s water polo student-athletes competed while ineligible as a result of the violations in this case. Therefore, pursuant to Bylaws 19.9.7-(g) and 31.2.2.3 and COI IOP 5-15-6, UCSB shall vacate all regular season and conference tournament records and participation in which the two ineligible student-athletes competed from the time they became ineligible through the time they were reinstated as eligible for competition.20 This order of vacation includes all regular season competition and conference tournaments. Further, if the ineligible student-athletes participated in NCAA postseason competition at any time they were ineligible, UCSB’s participation in the postseason contests in which the ineligible competition occurred shall be vacated.

15.  UCSB prohibited the men’s water polo coaching staff from engaging in recruiting communication with international prospective student-athletes (other than those already signed by the institution or verbally committed to the institution) from April 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018.

16.  Throughout the 2018-19 academic year, UCSB reduced CARA by four hours per week for cross country student-athletes and track and field student-athletes who are also on the cross country squad list.

17.  Throughout the 2018-19 academic year, UCSB required two days off from CARA per week for cross country student-athletes and track and field student-athletes who are also on the cross country squad list.

For any questions, feel free to contact Christian Dennie at cdennie@bgsfirm.com.